Doing Good, Doing Well by Erichson, Howard M.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 6 Article 6 
11-2004 
Doing Good, Doing Well 
Howard M. Erichson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 58 Vanderbilt Law Review 2087 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol58/iss6/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Doing Good, Doing Well
Howard M. Erichson*
I. INTRODU CTION ................................................................... 2087
II. MASS TORT LAWYERS AND POLICY MOTIVATIONS .............. 2093
III. DUAL OBJECTIVES AS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST ................ 2102
A. Multiple Motivations as Potential
Lawyer-Client Conflict ............................................ 2102
B. Multiple Motivations as Conflict
Mitigation in Mass Representation ........................ 2104
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST, PROFESSIONALISM, AND THE
PURSUIT O F W EALTH .......................................................... 2106
A. Defining Public Interest Lawyering ....................... 2106
B. Lawyer Professionalism .......................................... 2111
C. Redefining Public Interest Lawyering .................... 2114
1. Reconciling Public Interest with the
Business of Practicing Law ......................... 2115
2. Public Interest Lawyering and
Self-Serving Bias ......................................... 2120
V . C ON CLU SION ....................................................................... 2123
I. INTRODUCTION
On the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,' it
is fitting that we should take account not only of what has become of
school desegregation but also of the heroic public interest lawyer
figure embodied by Thurgood Marshall. For his role as "the chief
litigator for the civil rights movement,"2 Marshall is widely regarded
as a preeminent role model for public interest lawyers. 3 Descriptions
* Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author thanks Kathleen Clark, Edward
Hartnett, and Russell Pearce for their insights and comments and Julie von Bevern for her
helpful research assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Luke C. Moore & Thelma Wyatt Cummings, Justice Thurgood Marshall and His
Legacy: A Living Legend's Unceasing Commitment to Justice and Equality, 35 HoW. L.J. 37, 40
(1991).
3. Robert M. Bastress & Franklin D. Cleckley, Tribute to a Champion: Thurgood Marshall,
94 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) ("Reflection on Marshall's career provides a sorely needed model for
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of Marshall's career as a public interest advocate emphasize not only
his ability to "use the legal system as a tool for social change," 4 but
also his personal sacrifice as a lawyer who persevered despite low
pay. 5 The Marshall image thus encompasses the dominant elements
of the prevailing conception of the public interest lawyer: advocacy for
social change and commitment to the cause rather than to income.
For his work as a civil rights litigator and especially for his
success in Brown, Marshall is viewed as a shining example of a lawyer
who used his legal skills to advance the public good.6 Indeed, in
addition to the case's importance for school desegregation and equal
protection, Brown holds a significant place in the history of the
American legal profession as a symbol of litigation as a transformative
force and as an inspiration to more than a generation of lawyers. 7
Given the power of the Marshall legacy, it is no surprise that
many scholars and attorneys invoke his name to describe lawyers
working to advance their vision of the public good. Beatrice Dohrn,
legal director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, has been
public interest-minded law students and lawyers"); Denis F. McLaughlin, On Becoming a
Lawyer, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 510 (1996) (describing Marshall's role in Brown and urging
students to "[take a lesson in professional responsibility" from Marshall); Moore & Cummings,
supra note 2, at 48 ("Those of us who would follow must be guided by his vision .. ").
4. Moore & Cummings, supra note 2, at 40.
5. Marshall's success as a lawyer always has been measured by his achievements, not by
financial measures:
His accomplishments as a lawyer came at a personal sacrifice, as well. Not only did
his work deny him the pace and relaxation of a normal law practice and keep him
from home and family much of the year, but it also failed to pay him very well. The
Legal Defense Fund during Marshall's years always operated on a shoestring. In
1951, for example, after thirteen years as the Fund's chief lawyer and in payment for
yeoman services, his salary stood at $8,748.30. As indicated by financial statements
filed by federal judges, Marshall never did accumulate much in the way of assets, and
his wealth was always well below that of his brethren on the Supreme Court. Thus,
commitment, dedication, and sacrifice characterized Thurgood Marshall's career at
the bar.
Bastress & Cleckley, supra note 3, at 5 (footnote omitted); see also Ralph S. Spritzer, Thurgood
Marshall: A Dedicated Career, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 354 (1994) ("He had clients from the start,
but in the depths of the depression few had means to pay anything of significance. No one,
however, was turned away. At the end of the first year, expenses exceeded revenue. Soon,
Marshall began to earn a reputation as a lawyer for the poor .... ").
6. The president of the American Bar Association recently described lawyering as "a
calling to serve the public." Dennis W. Archer, Lawyer Power, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2003, at 8.
"Lawyers as healers," he wrote, "can promote a model that emphasizes the greater good." He
offered three examples of such lawyer-healers: Mohandas K. Gandhi, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
Thurgood Marshall. Id.
7. Stephen Yeazell captures this aspect of the historical significance of Brown: "Brown and
the civil rights litigation movement helped create in several generations of lawyers a new belief
in law and specifically litigation as a noble calling, as an avenue for social change." Stephen
Yeazell, The Civil Rights Movement and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975
(discussion draft at 1, on file with author).
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called "the Thurgood Marshall or Ruth Bader Ginsburg for gay and
lesbian civil rights."8  The American Bar Association's Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities annually honors "long-term
contributions by other members of the legal profession to the
advancement of civil rights, civil liberties, and human rights" with its
Thurgood Marshall Award.9 And Jay Sekulow, a leading anti-abortion
advocate, has been called "the Thurgood Marshall of our movement," 1°
demonstrating that Marshall's name is invoked for cause lawyering
without regard to whether he would have supported a particular
cause.
Despite political differences, it is understandable that
Marshall's name is used to describe these lawyers as advocates who
devote themselves to pursuing social change above the pursuit of
money. It seems more jarring, however, when lawyers in high-stakes
contingent fee litigation describe themselves as following in the
Marshall tradition of lawyer-activists. This is what has emerged at
least in some segments of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar. An asbestos
plaintiffs' lawyer whose website trumpets that she achieved the
"largest net verdict in California history in an asbestos injury case"
describes becoming a lawyer because of "my hero Thurgood
Marshall."11 Typifying a host of lawyers who look to Marshall as an
exemplar of the pursuit of "litigation as a noble calling,"12 she
describes her faith in the power of law to right injustices "[b]ecause of
Thurgood Marshall and others like him" and its connection to her own
practice:
As part of a law practice that encourages such passionate beliefs, I have had the
privilege of representing asbestos victims and their families against huge companies
8. Karen Dillon & Jim Schroeder, The Public Sector 45: Forty-five Young Lawyers Outside
the Private Sector Whose Vision and Commitment are Changing Lives, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1997,
at 71 (quoting former Lambda lawyer Amelia Craig).
9. Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, American Bar Association, Thurgood
Marshall Award, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/tmahistory.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2005). The award description notes that Marshall "epitomized individual commitment, in word
and action, to the cause of civil rights in this country." Id. The ABA's Thurgood Marshall Award
is only one of dozens of awards given in Marshall's name by bar associations and public interest
organizations around the country. The Boston Bar Association, for example, honors legal work
for the poor with its Thurgood Marshall Award, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York gives its Thurgood Marshall Award to lawyers fighting capital punishment.
10. Dillon & Schroeder, supra note 8, at 71 (quoting Keith Fournier, executive director of
the American Center for Law and Justice, a conservative Christian legal advocacy organization
of which Sekulow is chief counsel).
11. Kazan, McClain, Abrams, Fernandez, Lyons & Farrise, Simona A. Farrise: Overview;
Verdicts, at http://www.kazanlaw.com/attorneys/farrises.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
12. Yeazell, supra note 7, discussion draft at 1.
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that made and sold deadly asbestos products. I would never describe my work on behalf
of asbestos victims and their families as "ordinary" or simply "a job." 1 3
New Orleans trial lawyer Wendell Gauthier, in many ways the
epitome of the mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer, was a central figure in
litigation over the MGM Grand and San Juan Dupont Plaza hotel
fires, the Union Carbide chemical leak in Bhopal, silicone gel breast
implants, tobacco, and handguns. 14 When asked about his lawsuits
against the firearms industry, he invoked Thurgood Marshall's
legacy: 15 "We are taking the gun dealers to court because the political
process has failed us," Gauthier said. "If lawyers hadn't launched
Brown v. Board of Education, you would have never had school
integration because it was so unpopular with lawmakers.' 16
Undoubtedly, many people would be put off by hearing a wealthy
contingent fee trial lawyer compare his role to that of the lawyers who
"launched Brown." Gauthier does not fit the image of the self-
sacrificing public interest crusader. 17 As one lawyer put it, "the gun
suits are not Brown, the Castano lawyers are not Thurgood
Marshall."1 8
One interesting aspect of mass torts is that they combine the
disparate worlds of personal injury litigation and public interest law
practice. The policy implications are manifest in so-called "social
policy torts" such as tobacco and guns.1 9 A moment's examination,
however, shows significant public policy angles in all mass tort
13. Simon A. Farrise, supra note 11, at Overview.
14. PETER HARRY BROWN & DANIEL ABEL, OUTGUNNED: UP AGAINST THE NRA 14, 16 (2003);
Marcia Coyle, Runners-Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1994, at Cl1; Gregory Roberts, Wendell's New
War: Wendell Gauthier Has Made Millions for Victims of Fire, Plane Crashes, and Explosions.
Now He's Taking on the $100 Billion Tobacco Industry, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 29,
1994, at B1.
15. On Gauthier's role in the municipal gun litigation, see Howard M. Erichson, Private
Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs' Attorneys in Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS (Timothy D. Lytton
ed., forthcoming 2005).
16. BROWN & ABEL, supra note 14, at 10.
17. Stephen Yeazell notes that critics of the plaintiffs' bar emphasize the lawyers' wealth
and that the force of such criticism "comes from the implied contrast with the image presented by
the Brown plaintiffs-ill-paid and heroic liberators." Yeazell, supra note 7.
18. Stephen Pomper, Off Target: The Biggest Challenge to the NRA May Not Come from
Trial Lawyers, but from Demographics, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 51. By "Castano
lawyers," the author was referring to a coalition of lawyers who represented multiple
municipalities in the gun litigation, and who previously had brought the Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), case, a nationwide class action against the tobacco
industry. Id.
19. See Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative
Strategy Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495
(2001) (describing a new class of public and private suits that use litigation as a way to effectuate
legislative and social change).
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litigation, including pharmaceutical product liability and
environmental toxic torts. Because mass torts raise both public policy
concerns and the potential for huge money damages and fees, cases
involve competing motivations and breed intriguing alliances. Anti-
smoking activists worked side by side with tort lawyers and state
attorneys general. Anti-gun activists aligned with mass tort personal
injury lawyers and big city mayors. With these alliances comes an odd
convergence in which contingent fee lawyers fight for the public
interest, government lawyers fight for money damages, and public
interest lawyers fight for a share of the fees.
Rather than focusing on the differences between tort lawyers
and activists as they ally with each other, this Article focuses on the
motivations and explanations of the tort lawyers themselves.
Positioned at the intersection of big-money practice and social change
litigation, mass torts provide a useful study in multiple motivations.
While financial incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers explain much of what
happens in mass torts, policy objectives come into play as well, at least
in the lawyers' rhetoric. Despite the obvious difficulty distinguishing
reasons from rhetoric and rationalization, it is worth exploring the
significance of mixed motives for lawyers who are committed to both
policy objectives and the potential for large fees.
The idea that social change objectives partly motivate tort
lawyers raises several interesting questions. First, the combination of
monetary and policy goals arguably creates conflicts of interest. Just
as mixed alliances create conflicting interests among groups, an
individual lawyer's mixed motives can create lawyer-client conflicts of
interest. In a mass tort case for money damages, if the plaintiffs'
lawyers are driven partly by social change objectives and not solely by
maximizing each client's recovery, and if different strategies would
serve each of those goals, should that cause concern as a conflict of
interest between the lawyers and their clients?
Second, the multiple motivations of mass tort lawyers may
suggest a redefinition of "public interest" lawyering. Among lawyers
and law students, public interest law practice connotes low pay. If
mass tort lawyers use the rhetoric of public interest to describe their
work, should that lead to rethinking accepted notions of public
interest practice?
The danger of the prevailing conception of public interest
practice is that by excluding so much, it may undermine a sense of
commitment to the public interest in the everyday work that lawyers
do. If it is assumed that public interest lawyering is what lawyers do
for little or no pay, then does that suggest that in the majority of
lawyers' work-that is, in their standard fee-paying work-lawyers
2004] 2091
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simply pursue wealth and raw client interest without regard to
whether their work advances the public good? Lawyers may find it
convenient to convince themselves that they can be hired guns in their
everyday work because public interest work is something entirely
different. Public interest work, by this narrow conception, includes
the work performed by the relatively small number of lawyers who
comprise the public interest bar and the work performed by other
lawyers during the relatively small number of hours they commit to
pro bono practice.
Russell Pearce expresses this idea in terms of a retreat from an
earlier conception of lawyers as public guardians. 20 He suggests that
lawyers' commitment to the public good is an aspiration worth
reviving, but he observes that efforts at promoting this commitment
have failed.21 For such efforts to succeed, Pearce argues, "commitment
to the public good must be reconciled with the acknowledgement that
law is a business."22
This is precisely where mass tort lawyers may provide a useful
example, as they work at the intersection of social change advocacy
and big-money entrepreneurial practice. On the other hand, there is
reason to be skeptical that redefining the conception of public interest
lawyering would alter lawyer conduct to any significant degree. Given
the strength of self-serving bias as a cognitive matter, combined with
lawyers' extraordinary ability to take moral refuge in the adversary
system and the principle of moral nonaccountability, lawyers are
likely to see the public good in their own work and unlikely to rethink
basic commitments. Thus, while there is some appeal to rethinking
accepted notions of public interest lawyering so that substantial fee-
generating work is not excluded by definition, such rethinking may
accomplish little.
Part I of this Article explores the possibility of multiple
motivations of mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers, as well as the alliances
among activists and trial lawyers that have emerged in several recent
mass torts. Part II addresses the conflicts of interest that arise when
considerations other "than maximizing clients' recovery motivate
lawyers. While such conflicts exist, a mix of monetary and policy
motivations may reduce, rather than exacerbate, the lawyer-client
20. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 381, 417-19 (2001) [hereinafter America's Governing Class]; see also Russell G.
Pearce, Retreat of the Elite: How Public Interest Law and Pro Bono Undermine Business Lawyers'
Commitment to the Public Good, AM. LAW., July 2001, at 79 [hereinafter Retreat of the Elite].
21. Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, supra note 20, at 79.
22. Id.
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conflicts that inhere in mass representation. In mass collective
representation, mixed motives more accurately reflect the combined
interests of groups of similarly situated individual clients.
Part III turns to questions of professionalism, the prevailing
conception of public interest lawyering, and the possibility of serving
the public good while pursuing private gain. The standard conception
of public interest law practice, although rarely articulated with
precision, tends to focus on market-undervalued legal work.23 While
this definition makes sense for determining whether certain legal
work ought to be subsidized, the prevailing conception may have an
unintended consequence once internalized by lawyers and law
students. Paradoxically, the prevailing conception of public interest
lawyering may discourage lawyers in most of their work from
considering the public good. In this sense, a vision of professionalism
that acknowledges the possibility of significant private gain while
serving the public interest may better serve the profession. On the
other hand, self-serving bias may influence lawyers to view their own
fee-generating work as public-serving. The benefit or harm of a
broader understanding of public interest law practice depends on the
extent to which, when lawyers perceive themselves as serving the
public interest, they merely have persuaded themselves of the
goodness of their own pursuit of wealth.
Mass tort plaintiffs' practice, situated at the crossroads of
public law and private tort litigation, combines notable public policy
objectives with unmistakable fee potential. Because it presents mixed
motives for lawyers more palpably than most other areas of practice, it
offers a useful starting point for thinking about fee-generating work in
which lawyers seek to advance the public interest.
II. MASS TORT LAWYERS AND POLICY MOTIVATIONS
In the past decade, mass tort litigation has gained
controversial recognition as a public policy forum. As plaintiffs'
lawyers have pursued claims concerning tobacco, handguns, lead
paint, and health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), the relevance
of mass tort litigation to public policy has become impossible to ignore.
Deborah Hensler describes these as "social policy torts. ' 24 Referring to
lawsuits over guns, HMOs, and above all, tobacco, she notes the
appeal of such social policy tort litigation to activists and trial lawyers:
"To some advocacy groups, tobacco litigation seemed to offer a new
23. See text accompanying notes 103-108, infra.
24. Hensler, supra note 19, at 495.
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prescription for pursuing social change. To some lawyers, it opened
new vistas for entrepreneurial activity."25
Recognition does not necessarily imply acceptance. While some
observers consider public policy mass tort litigation a welcome
development, others view the development quite differently. To some,
tort litigation serves as an integral part of American democracy and
promotes corporate responsibility and product safety. 26 To others,
public policy debates driven by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers are
antidemocratic and dangerous to society.27 Both sides agree, however,
that mass tort litigation brings public policy debates into the
courtroom and places significant policymaking power in the hands of
lawyers, judges, and juries.
It is misleading to draw too neat a line between public policy
torts such as guns and tobacco, on the one hand, and other mass torts
such as pharmaceutical cases, mass disasters, or mass toxic exposure,
on the other. By its very nature as litigation over conduct allegedly
causing widespread injury, all mass tort litigation carries significant
public policy consequences. Twenty years ago, David Rosenberg
recognized that mass tort litigation can be understood as a form of
"public law" litigation.28 With this observation, he linked mass torts to
25. Id; see also Erichson, supra note 15 (addressing gun litigation in the context of public
debate over gun control).
26. See CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 218-20 (2001). According to
Bogus, product liability litigation accomplishes three purposes. First, it improves safety by
"increas[ing] the manufacturer's cost of distributing unreasonably dangerous products." Id. at
218. Second, "the discovery process unearths facts that would otherwise remain within the dark
recesses of the corporations," and the risk of exposure alters both corporate and personal
calculations for executives "debating whether to distribute dangerous products." Id. at 219.
Third, by allowing citizens as jurors to pass judgment on corporate decisions, it offers a means
for the people to "participate in the affairs that affect them." Id. at 219-20.
27. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW (2003). Referring to a series of mass torts including
tobacco, handguns, breast implants, and asbestos, Olson argues that the lawyers of the mass tort
plaintiffs' bar have advanced their own wealth and power to the detriment of American
democracy:
The new rule of lawyers brings us many evils, but perhaps the greatest is the way it
robs the American people of the right to find its own future and pursue its own
destiny.... [H]owever uncertain the results of democracy, however slow and clumsy
its procedures, we can feel quite sure that it is a better course than agreeing to turn
over our rights of self-government to a new class of unaccountable lawyers.
Id. at 314.
28. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULTIPARTY DEVICES 41 (1995) (detailing the similarities between mass tort cases and public
litigation). I have argued that the public law nature of mass tort litigation necessitates a more
hands-on approach than most United States judges are comfortable employing. Howard M.
Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 1985 (1999).
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school desegregation and other impact litigation-the sorts of lawsuits
that Abram Chayes primarily had in mind when he introduced his
public law litigation paradigm eight years earlier. 29 Public policy
implications are manifest in mass pharmaceutical product liability
cases including fen-phen 30 and Bendectin, 31 litigation concerning mass
disasters such as hotel fires and airplane crashes, 32 tort claims
addressing mass human rights violations, 33 and toxic tort litigation
involving polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"),34 the gasoline additive
methyl tertiary-butyl ether ("MTBE"), 35  and numerous other
substances.
Much of the recent commentary on mass tort litigation
assumes that plaintiffs' lawyers have an entrepreneurial mindset in
which lawyers assess cost and likely investment return when
evaluating litigation opportunities. 36 As with debate over the policy
significance of mass tort litigation, observers are split on the
soundness of financial incentives as driving forces for plaintiffs'
lawyers. Those who support the role of plaintiffs' lawyers as private
attorneys general, for the most part, view legal fees as an appropriate
and effective mechanism for inducing plaintiffs' lawyers to invest in
29. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (noting that "school desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners'
or inmates' rights cases" are the types of cases that display the features of public law litigation).
30. See generally ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG
COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001) (discussing
lawsuits involving the diet drug combination fen-phen).
31. See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996) (discussing policy implications of lawsuits against
the manufacturer of Bendectin).
32. The public nature of legal representation for mass disaster victims has led some states
to establish programs to provide legal assistance to victims in the wake of disasters. Jim
Edwards, Bar, State Join in Legal Aid Plan for Disaster Victims, N.J. L.J., Feb. 2, 2004, at 1.
33. Class action lawyer Elizabeth Cabraser describes of the use of mass tort litigation to
seek justice for victims of human rights violations, including victims of the Holocaust and victims
of the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Human Rights Violations as
Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United States Civil Litigation System, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2211 (2004).
34. Michael Grunwald, Proposed Settlement in PCB Case Denounced, WASH. POST, Mar. 24,
2002, at A6; Michael Grunwald, Monsanto Held Liable for PCB Dumping, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
2002, at Al.
35. Dan Morgan, Nursing a Fragile Energy Bill; Protection for Fuel-Additive Makers a
Sticking Point in Senate, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2003, at A5.
36. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 683-84 (1986) ("[Olne better understands the behavior of the plaintiffs
attorney in class and derivative actions if one views him not as an agent, but more as an
entrepreneur who regards a litigation as a risky asset that requires continuing investment
decisions.").
20952004]
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cases that will advance the public good. 37 The same idea, though, is
attacked by those who view civil litigation as a threat to business or as
a circumvention of democratic processes. 38 Both sides, however, share
an understanding that the driving force behind much civil litigation is
the pursuit of fees by plaintiffs' lawyers 39 and, indeed, financial
incentives for the lawyers explain a good deal of what goes on in mass
tort litigation.
The pursuit of wealth, however, need not be the only
explanation for why lawyers pursue particular litigation or how they
go about it.40 Just as lawyers in "public interest" litigation explain
their involvement in terms of commitment to the cause, 41 similar
37. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega
Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001) ("It is only the possibility of private
attorneys general receiving a contingency fee that permits lawsuits to be brought to vindicate the
public interest.").
38. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS 32 (2003) (criticizing those who
"regard contingency fees - and the encouragement they gave to speculative litigation - not as a
lesser evil that should be limited to the cases where it was necessary, but as something
wholesome and beneficial in itself'); Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee
Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 664, 706 (2003)
(arguing that contingent fees are non-competitive, increase the volume of tort litigation, and
require greater regulation).
39. This view is consistent with public opinion about lawyers. A consumer survey in 2001
found that 74 percent agreed that "[l]awyers are more interested in winning than in seeing that
justice is served," and 69 percent agreed that "[l]awyers are more interested in making money
than in serving their clients." Only 39 percent agreed that "[m]ost lawyers try to serve the public
interests well." LITIGATION SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7 (Apr. 2002) (report prepared by Leo J. Shapiro &
Assocs.).
40. Analyzing the motivations of cause lawyers, Carrie Menkel-Meadow considers the
psychology literature on prosocial behavior and notes that "at the individual level of motivation,
humans seldom act from a unidimensional, single-purpose motivation. Thus, more interesting
studies of human behavior are currently focused on the 'mixed motives' that are more accurate
explanations of our behavior." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward
an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31, 38 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
41. Long-time civil rights lawyer Jack Greenberg describes his decision, early in his career,
to remain at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund rather than accept a lucrative offer to join a
private firm as an antitrust lawyer representing corporate interests. Although the offer was
"attractive," Greenberg writes, "I have to care about what I do." JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS
IN THE COURTS 91 (1994). He also describes a conversation he had with his colleague Louis
Pollak, a civil rights lawyer who later became a law professor, dean, and federal judge:
One day as we worked together on an early phase of the school cases, Lou and I met at
the Columbia law library and took a walk outside and speculated about how we hoped
to spend our careers. We agreed that we would be happy if we could work at matters
we cared about so long as we could earn five or six thousand dollars a year.
Id. at 160.
For a discussion of the many-faceted motivations of cause lawyers, see Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 40, at 31-68. Menkel-Meadow defines cause lawyering as "any activity that seeks to use
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explanations often can be heard from plaintiffs' lawyers in mass tort
litigation, focusing on their contribution to the public good.
Self-serving declarations, of course, prove very little. Just
because lawyers say they pursue cases because they believe in the
righteousness of the cause does not make it true, and it is difficult to
sort reasons from rhetoric and rationalization. When mass tort
lawyers describe their work in terms of serving the public good, it is no
doubt in part because they believe that the rhetoric of public interest
serves their purposes and because they wish to rationalize self-
interested conduct by attributing to themselves a noble cause.
Rhetoric and rationalization, however, should not be dismissed as
irrelevant. Not all lawyers describe their work in terms of social
change or service to the greater good, as distinguished from service to
their own clients.
Moreover, some of the rhetoric is backed up by litigation
decisions that suggest genuine commitment to the policy objectives.
In the tobacco litigation, for example, private lawyers Michael Ciresi,
Roberta Walburn, and others represented the State of Minnesota
along with attorney general Skip Humphrey. The lawyers stood to
earn enormous fees by settling the matter, and they might have
sought a more certain and more lucrative settlement by acceding to a
confidentiality agreement. Nonetheless, they refused to settle on a
basis that would have kept the documents secret. They agreed to
settle only if the documents they had discovered would be placed in a
document depository and made available to the public. As one of the
tobacco industry lawyers recalls the negotiations, "Ciresi said, 'We've
got to have immediate disclosure of the documents.' "42 Antitobacco
activist Richard Daynard describes the importance of this stance:
The documents in general come out because Skip Humphrey and Mike Ciresi refuse to
settle their case unless the documents are going to be made public. I mean, we're
talking about Profiles in Courage. Most of the other folks would have settled with a
little bit of a nod, a fig leaf in the direction of document disclosure. . . . You had a
law-related means or seeks to change laws or regulations to achieve greater social justice - both
for particular individuals (drawing on individualistic 'helping' orientations) and for
disadvantaged groups." Id. at 37. In a study of cause lawyering in Argentina and Brazil,
Stephen Meili notes that the personal motivations of the lawyers, while multifaceted, "seem to
fall into two discrete categories: a very personal and frequently moral desire to fight injustice,
and a more public sense of their individual role in the transition to democracy; that is, a
transition that includes adherence to the rule of law." Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyers and Social
Movements: A Comparative Perspective on Democratic Change in Argentina and Brazil, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 487, 501 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
42. DEBORAH CAULFIELD RYBAK & DAVID PHELPS, SMOKED: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL 385 (1998) (quoting R.J. Reynolds lawyer Arthur Golden).
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combination of an attorney general who knew why he brought the case and a law firm
that knew why they went in on the case, and it wasn't for the bucks.4 3
Rather than seeking to maximize the monetary recovery and
their own fees, the lawyers took the path they thought was more likely
to serve the public interest by making information on the tobacco
industry publicly accessible.
Other plaintiffs' lawyers in the tobacco litigation have shared
information and ideas with each other to an extent that cannot readily
be explained in terms of each lawyer's self-interest. These actions
make more sense in terms of commitment to the antitobacco cause.
Daynard describes the "missionary group"44 of lawyers involved in the
Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association, including Woody Wilner, Madelyn
Chaber, and Michael Piuze, as being "really committed to seeing that
more and more cases get brought, even if they don't make a penny on
the other cases being brought, because it should happen."45
Plaintiffs' lawyers in a wide range of mass tort cases describe
their motivations in terms of policy objectives and are subsequently
perceived as crusaders. In the mass tort litigation over Agent Orange,
one of the leading plaintiffs' lawyers was Victor Yannacone, who Peter
Schuck described as "a passionate partisan, a crusader who was
personally and ideologically committed to subduing toxic chemicals in
the interest of preserving ecological balance and human health."46
Alex MacDonald, one of the leading plaintiffs' lawyers in the mass tort
litigation over the diet drug combination fen-phen, describes his
responsibility as an attorney as "awesome and holy."47  MacDonald
43. Interview with Professor Richard Daynard, Director, Tobacco Products Liability Project
(Boston, Apr. 26, 2002).
44. Id.
45. Id. Daynard leaves no doubt that he believes in these lawyers' commitment to the
antitobacco cause: "There are a group of people who brought these cases .... before during and
after, they've looked the tobacco companies in the eye, and they've seen the face of evil, and they
want to really make sure these guys are held accountable in more than occasional cases." Id.
His account of the Castano Group lawyers, who unsuccessfully brought a nationwide class action
against the tobacco industry in the mid-1990s and then branched out into statewide class
actions, is more mixed:
I think there were mixed motives in Castano. I think there were some people in
Castano who were real believers, and some of them may still be. Some may still be. I
think there were people in the Castano Group who just saw it as an investment.
Some saw it as an investment and a good time - "should be fun, while we make a lot
of money." But I think there were some real believers in there who I think are
probably still good people and probably still would continue to do the right thing for
the right reason.
Id.
46. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToxIc DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 43
(1986).
47. MUNDY, supra note 30, at 31. Like many lawyers who feel devoted to representing a
particular set of interests in litigation, MacDonald cannot imagine representing the other side: "I
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speaks about the class action settlement in the diet drugs litigation as
a source of deep personal satisfaction. 48 A declaration of public-
interestedness seems to have become the tort lawyer's standard
explanation. 49
The rhetoric of social change in mass tort litigation reached a
crescendo in the third wave of tobacco litigation during the late 1990s,
when mass tort lawyers teamed with state attorneys general to pursue
government recoupment litigation against the tobacco industry.
Deborah Hensler relates a comment of leading plaintiffs' lawyer
Richard Scruggs at a conference on tobacco litigation: "Our purpose
was to change the world."50 Other tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers shared
this fervor, sometimes with religious overtones, as with Mississippi
trial lawyer Don Barrett, who played a leading role in the tobacco
don't know how my adversaries get up in the morning. I wouldn't do it. I'd drive a garbage truck
before I represented a drug company." Interview with attorney Alex MacDonald (Boston, Apr.
26, 2002).
48. "Is it perfect? No. Did people give up some stuff? Yeah. But do I sit back with an
element of pride? When I tell my grandchildren, 'you see this grid here, that for fifteen years
allowed people with valvulopathy and all to get paid and they could move up to a higher level of
compensation if their disease progressed' - I'm awfully proud I played a role in that." Interview
with Alex MacDonald, supra note 47.
49. Even Texas trial lawyer Joe Jamail-probably known less for public-mindedness than
for his litigation antics, see Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994), and his wealth, see Special Report: The World's Richest People 2004, FORBES.COM,
available at http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/10/2004LIR.jhtml?passListld=l0&passYear
=2004&passListType=Person&uniqueId=H8XP&datatype=Person (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) -
describes his own work as "the protection of the public interest." JOE JAMAIL, LAWYER: MY
TRIALS AND JUBILATIONS 66 (2003). He adds, "If there is a distinction I believe justifies my
existence on earth, it is this: I am personally responsible for three national recalls - by
Remington Arms, Honda, and Parlodel drugs. They can engrave that on my tombstone." Id.
The president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America quoted the passage above by Jamail
in a recent defense of trial lawyers, and he offered a litany of mass torts and other product
liability cases as evidence that plaintiffs' lawyers serve the public good not only by serving the
needs of particular clients, but also by changing the way business is done:
Reports of civil lawsuits that have resulted in more responsible business practices and
a safer society would fill volumes. Consider these: A 1970 case of a four-year-old
burned badly by highly flammable pajamas led to congressional action setting tougher
standards. Injuries and deaths caused by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device gave
rise to litigation that forced the manufacturer, A.H. Robins Co., to remove its product
from the market. As a result of a 1998 lawsuit brought by a Boeing employee who
contracted leukemia after continual exposure to electromagnetic pulse radiation, the
company implemented safety procedures to protect others. And most recently, after
numerous lawsuits were filed seeking compensation for deaths linked to the dietary
supplement ephedra, the FDA banned the product.
David S. Casey, Jr., The Good That Trial Lawyers Do, TRIAL, Feb. 2004, at 9.
50. Hensler, supra note 19, at 496 n.17. On another occasion, Scruggs described the
purpose of the attempted nationwide settlement in 1997: "Everything is aimed at stopping kids
from starting to smoke and ultimately remedying this enormous public health problem we have
in this country." Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Settlement: Practical Implications and the
Future of Tort Law, 67 MISS. L.J. 847, 854 (1998) (quoting Richard Scruggs).
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litigation. According to one account, "Barrett said he had come to
believe that he was doing God's work. He thanked the Lord that he
had been given this opportunity to fight the wrongdoings of the
tobacco companies; he was a crusader."51
Wendell Gauthier, the leader of the Castano52 coalition of
plaintiffs' lawyers in the tobacco litigation and the driving force
behind the group's shift into gun litigation,53 continued to devote
himself to both the tobacco and gun cases even as he fought the cancer
that claimed his life in 2001. "I was already in the fight against
tobacco and was in the early planning stages for the gun litigation,"
Gauthier said in an interview reported in a book coauthored by one of
his law partners:
I was leading these two legal armadas, which is one reason I kept my bout with cancer a
guarded secret. Few outside of my family and close associates knew. Radiation and
chemotherapy would have attracted attention to the disease and would, therefore, have
hindered the two big causes that meant the most to me. 5 4
The same book reports that Gaitthier "viewed the fight for gun
control as the crowning achievement of his career; he knew he was in
pursuit of something far more important than money. '55
Given the public policy significance of mass tort litigation, it
naturally has bred alliances of trial lawyers and activists. 56 In
litigation over handguns, lawyer-activists teamed up with mass tort
plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue lawsuits against the firearms industry.57
51. PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 22 (1998). Pringle
describes Barrett as a devout Methodist who "believed the tobacco companies should be forced to
be more socially responsible. Beating them up in court was one way to make them do their
public duty." Id.
52. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
53. Gauthier organized and led the Castano Group, a coalition of over sixty plaintiffs' law
firms that united in 1994 to pursue a nationwide class action against the tobacco industry and
that shifted its attention to statewide class actions when the nationwide class was decertified,
see Castano, 84 F.3d at 737. As the group's tobacco work faded, Gauthier persuaded roughly half
of the lawyers to participate in municipal lawsuits against handgun manufacturers. See
Erichson, supra note 15 (discussing the role of Gauthier and other private plaintiffs' lawyers in
the municipal gun litigation).
54. BROWN & ABEL, supra note 14, at 288-89.
55. Id. at 74.
56. These alliances between mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers and activists share some features
with the alliances that have emerged between mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers and government
entities, most prominently in the tobacco, handgun, and lead paint litigation. See Howard M.
Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and
Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2000) (discussing
government entities' use of private lawyers to pursue lawsuits for recoupment of government
funds spent due to dangerous products or substances).
57. Erichson, supra note 15.
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Dennis Henigan of the Legal Action Project, the litigation branch of
the Brady Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, forged alliances with
private law firms that represented both municipal plaintiffs and
individual plaintiffs in gun lawsuits.58 Similar alliances were formed
in the tobacco litigation. The consortium of private lawyers that filed
the Castano tobacco class action 59 worked closely with Richard
Daynard, a long-time antitobacco activist and law professor who
founded the Tobacco Products Liability Project.60 Daynard served on
the Castano Group's executive committee and discovery committee. 61
The Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, an organization that links trial
lawyers with social change litigation opportunities, represents a
broader alliance between the plaintiffs' bar and the public interest
community. "He has managed to bridge the gap between commercial
trial lawyers and public interest lawyers," one lawyer says of the
group's executive director. 62 These alliances between the private
plaintiffs' bar and the community of social change activists or cause
lawyers allow for cross-fertilization of ideas and encourage lawyers to
think of their work in terms of multiple motivations and objectives. 63
58. Id.; Peter J. Boyer, Big Guns, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 53, 54-67; BROWN &
ABEL, supra note 14, at 18.
59. Castano v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 1996).
60. See PRINGLE, supra note 51, at 6 (describing Daynard as "a veteran antitobacco activist
[who] had been made an honorary member of Gauthier's group because of his encyclopedic
knowledge of tobacco litigation and his legendary steel-trap mind."). The administrator of the
Castano Plaintiffs' Legal Committee describes traveling to Daynard's office in Boston to
photocopy documents from his files. Although the professor's files were "totally disorganized,"
she and her Castano Group companions-relative newcomers to tobacco litigation-learned the
benefit of allying with someone who had been an antitobacco activist for years. In Daynard's
files, they found "huge amounts of documents," which they copied and promptly began to code,
early in the litigation process. "People had been sending him documents for years, from every
tobacco case." Interview with Suzanne Foulds, Administrator, Castano Plaintiffs' Legal
Committee (New Orleans, Jan. 7, 2002).
61. Interview with Richard Daynard, supra note 43.
62. Dillon & Schroeder, supra note 8, at 67-68 (quoting attorney Alan Morrison of Public
Citizen Litigation Group, speaking about Trial Lawyers for Public Justice executive director
Arthur Bryant).
63. The convergence of "public interest" lawyering and mass tort plaintiffs' practice involves
not only litigation alliances, but also individual career spans. One prominent example is Bill
Lann Lee, who joined the class action firm Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein after twenty-
five years practicing civil rights law at the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Center for Law in the Public Interest,
and as the Clinton Administration's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. In the firm's
press release announcing the decision, Lee connected his commitment to public interest with the
firm's practice: "Class actions enable large groups of people to obtain justice. They also compel
an industry or employer to undertake reforms for their workers and the public." Press Release,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Former Top Justice Department Official Bill Lann Lee
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III. DUAL OBJECTIVES AS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
A. Multiple Motivations as Potential Lawyer-Client Conflict
To the extent mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers are motivated by
policy objectives such as improving product safety, fostering corporate
responsibility or, for that matter, by any considerations other than
maximizing their clients' recovery, do lawyer-client conflicts of interest
arise? A conflict arises if a lawyer's commitment to social change
objectives constrains the lawyer's ability or willingness to pursue the
client's goals. 64 Among the fundamental building blocks of legal ethics
is the principle that the client decides the objectives of the
representation.6 5 Put differently, in a lawyer-client relationship, the
client is the principal and the lawyer is the agent. When a lawyer's
own policy agenda becomes a driving force in the representation, it
may create a conflict. 66
Peter Schuck describes such conflicting agendas in the Agent
Orange litigation, which involved claims by veterans against chemical
companies based on exposure to a defoliant used during the Vietnam
War. Schuck relates two versions-the lawyer's and the client's-of a
conversation in which attorney Victor Yannacone asked his client,
Vietnam veteran Frank McCarthy, what the veterans hoped to
accomplish in the litigation:
In Yannacone's version, McCarthy said the veterans wanted four things: "We want to
turn the American people around so that the Vietnam combat soldier will no longer be
abused and dishonored. We want to get the benefits that we are entitled to. We want to
Joins Law Firm of Lieff Cabraser. Heimann & Bernstein (Oct. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/lee-press.htm.
64. As a general rule, a lawyer may not represent a client if "there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited ... by a personal interest of
the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2004).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and. . . shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued."). The comment explains, "Paragraph (a) confers
upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations." Id.
cmt. 1.
66. Geoffrey Miller raises this concern with regard to public interest class actions:
Public interest attorneys receive compensation in the form of the psychic reward that
accompanies a feeling of promoting the good of society. This public interest
motivation may induce counsel to act out of political or ideological beliefs that can
come into conflict with the interests of the class. The reasonable plaintiff will prefer
that counsel not seek to further her own political or ideological objectives if the
outcome is not optimal for the class.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 618 (2003).
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find out what is killing us. And we want the American taxpayer not to have to pay for
injuries the chemical companies caused." McCarthy claims to have had somewhat more
limited goals: "Yannacone has always seen the [Agent Orange case] as a public interest
litigation," he recalls. "To us it was and still is a remedial measure" designed to compel
the chemical companies to pay for medical testing and treatment and compensation for
the veterans and their families.
6 7
The difference between treating the litigation as "public
interest litigation" and as "a [compensatory] remedial measure" is the
heart of the conflict of interest. 68 Not only did the lawyer-crusader
Yannacone 69 treat the matter as public interest litigation, but also,
according to this account, he convinced himself that his clients shared
his objectives.
A number of litigation scenarios can demonstrate the conflict
between a public interest orientation and a compensation orientation.
First, divergent objectives naturally lead to different preferences for
remedies. Whether by adjudication or settlement, there may be
questions of whether to pursue injunctive relief, money damages, or
both. A person committed to the cause may give greater weight to
injunctive remedies. A person seeking to maximize monetary recovery
may give less weight to injunctive remedies or, in a class action or
other context requiring court approval, may even prefer to include
illusory injunctive remedies combined with significant money
damages.
Second, while defendants often prefer to keep discovery and
settlements confidential, plaintiffs' responses to defendants'
confidentiality demands depend on their objectives. Plaintiffs seeking
maximum recovery generally acquiesce in defendants' requests for
confidentiality in both discovery and settlements, because
confidentiality has a value to defendants and some of that value is
passed on to plaintiffs. Discovery flows more easily after a discovery
confidentiality agreement, and settlement confidentiality elevates the
dollar values that defendants are willing to negotiate. Confidentiality
agreements, however, by preventing information from becoming
public, may interfere with the social change or public safety objectives
of cause lawyers. A committed cause lawyer pursuing the litigation as
a way to achieve social change would be loath to agree to keep
discovery or settlement secret, if disclosure would advance the cause.
67. SCHUCK, supra note 46, at 44.
68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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B. Multiple Motivations as Conflict Mitigation in Mass Representation
Given the analysis above, it may appear that plaintiffs'
attorneys who are motivated not merely by the pursuit of monetary
recovery and high fees, but also by policy objectives, carry a conflict of
interest. In most mass representation, however, rather than creating
or exacerbating conflicts, multiple motivations tend to reduce them.
To minimize lawyer-client conflicts of interest in mass representation,
a lawyer with multiple motivations is preferable to a lawyer who cares
only about maximizing recovery and fees. Multiple motivations better
reflect the mix of objectives held by a mass of clients. To assume that
every plaintiff seeks only to maximize individual net monetary
recovery is to oversimplify plaintiffs' objectives.
Just as plaintiffs in school desegregation cases and other
impact litigation often view the cause rather than the individual
benefit as their primary objective, sometimes disagreeing among
themselves as to the particular objectives, so do some mass tort
plaintiffs. In virtually every mass tort, some plaintiffs become actively
involved in the cause and relate to the litigation more as crusaders
than as potential beneficiaries. In the product liability litigation over
the morning sickness drug Bendectin, for example, plaintiff Betty
Mekdeci, whose son was born with birth defects, saw herself as a
crusader. 70 Similarly, in the mass tort litigation concerning the diet
drug combination fen-phen, plaintiff Mary Linnen asked her lawyer to
promise her that he would "[d]o everything [he] [could] to get these
drugs off the market. ' 71 Carla Sickles, another fen-phen plaintiff, said
that she did not care whether she won the lawsuit as long as the word
got out about the dangers of the drugs. 72 In the Agent Orange
litigation, although attorney Yannacone and client McCarthy may
have had different objectives, 73 other clients shared Yannacone's
vision of the lawsuit as public interest litigation. Schuck describes
another of the plaintiffs, Michael Ryan, as "a crusader not so much on
behalf of veterans as against what he sees as the growing chemical
contamination of the world. 'It is too late for the veterans and their
children,' he says. 'It is their--our--grandchildren I want to save.' "74
Indeed, the public policy agenda of some mass tort plaintiffs
can create a lawyer-client conflict of interest that is the mirror image
of the conflict described above. An entrepreneurial lawyer who has
70. GREEN, supra note 31, at 111.
71. MUNDY, supra note 30, at 17.
72. Id. at 151.
73. See supra notes 67-69.
74. SCHUCK, supra note 46, at 48.
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invested time and resources into mass tort litigation has a powerful
incentive to increase both the likelihood and the monetary value of
settlement. These goals may conflict with the public interest
objectives of some of the plaintiffs themselves. 75 In the Agent Orange
litigation, leadership of the plaintiffs' case passed from Victor
Yannacone, with his public interest orientation, to mass tort lawyers
who were better able to finance the litigation.76 When these lawyers
settled the case for $180 million, client Michael Ryan wondered, "Is it
a lawyers' case or the clients' case?"7 7 The settlement permitted the
defendants to disclaim any wrongdoing, which, for many veterans,
defeated the central purpose of the litigation. 78
In the aggregate, clients have multiple motivations. Thus, the
conflict of interest problems in mass representation include not only
lawyer-client conflicts, but also conflicting objectives among the clients
themselves. 79 In these client-client conflicts over litigation goals, mass
torts resemble social change litigation in which plaintiffs, despite their
alignment on issues of liability, may diverge on questions of the most
appropriate remedy. As I have argued at length elsewhere, client-
75. The conflict between a client with public interest objectives and a lawyer driven to
maximize fees comes up not only in private civil litigation, but even more directly in cases with
public entity clients represented by private contingent fee lawyers. Erichson, supra note 56, at
35-40 (raising concerns about the use of private contingent fee lawyers for government lawsuits,
including potential conflicts between entrepreneurial incentives and the public good).
Conflicting interests between contingent fee lawyers and public clients matter most when
determining negotiated or adjudicated remedies:
Even when the AG is a faithful agent of the public interest, the contingency fee
lawyers may not be faithful agents of the public-regarding AG. In the context of
parens patriae litigation along the tobacco model, contingency fee lawyers' pursuit of
their own private interests may lead them to engage in one or more of three
troublesome courses of conduct [including] favoring monetary relief over nonmonetary
relief, even when public interest considerations support the nonmonetary relief ...
[and] endeavoring to have the government plaintiffs grant the defendant
nonmonetary benefits in return for monetary recovery for the plaintiffs, even when
doing so is not supported by public interest considerations.
David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens
Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 324-25 (2001).
76. SCHUCK, supra note at 46, at 84, 109.
77. Id. at 169.
78. Schuck describes the reaction of some of the veterans to the class action settlement:
For many like the Ryans, as Yannacone continually proclaimed, this defeated the
central purpose of the Agent Orange case, which had always been to publicize,
palliate, and in some sense justify the veterans' sufferings by allowing them to tell
their story, find an authoritative explanation for their conditions, and assign moral
and legal responsibility. Compared to this goal, the prospect of monetary
compensation, although important, was for these veterans decidedly subsidiary.
Id. at 171.
79. Similar conflicts arise among class members in class actions. See Miller, supra note 66,
at 622-625 (discussing conflicts between the class representative and absent class members) and
at 626-686 (discussing conflicts between class representatives).
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client conflicts of interest inhere in the representation of multiple
plaintiffs in mass litigation, and to a certain extent such conflicts
should be tolerated in order to provide plaintiffs with the benefits of
collective representation. 0  While plaintiffs' lawyers who engage in
mass collective representation should disclose the potential client-
client conflicts to their clients at the outset of the representation and
should obtain their clients' informed consent,81  some conflicts
inevitably emerge among a mass of clients. These inherent conflicts
do not necessarily render mass representation improper.8 2 The good
lawyer understands that individual clients within the aggregate have
a variety of objectives8 3 and strives to serve the group's interests as
effectively as possible while preserving the core of client autonomy.8 4
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST, PROFESSIONALISM, AND THE PURSUIT OF
WEALTH
A. Defining Public Interest Lawyering
The prevailing conception of "public interest" lawyering defines
it, in large part, in terms of the lawyer's financial self-sacrifice. Public
interest lawyers are thought to be lawyers who give up personal
pecuniary gain in order to devote their legal work to the public good -
lawyers who "have followed their hearts, not necessarily their wallets,
into careers that they are convinced will make a difference in the
world."8 5 Just as Thurgood Marshall devoted his law practice to a
cause that he believed in despite low pay and personal sacrifice,8 6 so
have many others who are considered to be public interest lawyers.8 7
80. Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 543-79 (2003).
81. Id. at 558-67.
82. Id.
83. For an analysis of issues concerning individuals within mass aggregate litigation,
especially as they relate to individually-retained plaintiffs' attorneys and the allocation of fees,
see generally Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996).
84. Erichson, supra note 80, at 530.
85. Dillon & Schroeder, supra note 8, at 80.
86. Bastress & Cleckley, supra note 3, at 5.
87. See, e.g., Dillon & Schroeder, supra note 8, at 71 (Luke Cole upon graduation from
Harvard Law School, wanted to do environmental law work on behalf of impoverished minorities
and "finally persuaded the San Francisco-based California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation to
give him an office and a phone - but no salary."). Another public interest lawyer was
complimented for his self-sacrificing commitment: "He forgoes the monetary rewards to do what
he thinks is right." Id. at 85 (quoting plaintiffs' lawyer Fred Baron, speaking about attorney
Brian Wolfman of Public Citizen Litigation Group).
[Vol. 57:6:20872106
DOING GOOD, DOING WELL
But where is it written that public interest lawyers must take a vow of
poverty? I do not mean this purely as a rhetorical question. It is
worth examining how and why the legal profession defines public
interest in a way that suggests that large fees are inconsistent with
public interest lawyering.
For law students, the most widely examined definitions of
public interest practice may be the definitions included in law school
loan forgiveness programs.88 The University of Virginia Law School's
loan forgiveness program, for example, explicitly defines "public
service employment" in terms of the amount of compensation. 89 The
program provides funds to cover law school loan payments for
graduates "who enter public service employment" and earn less than
$60,000 per year. It initially defines public interest as follows:
"Public-service employment is defined broadly to include jobs with
federal, state or local governments, legal aid offices, prosecutors,
public defenders, public interest organizations, and legal reform
groups that qualify as nonprofit organizations." 90  Significantly,
however, the program's definition-broad as it is-is not limited to the
listed job types, but extends to in-state private practitioners who meet
the compensation criterion:
The program's definition of public-service employment also includes those in private
practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia who earn less than $60,000 per year in a
private firm on the assumption they are quite likely to be practicing in an underserved
area and therefore performing a public service.
9 1
Similarly, New York University Law School describes its loan
repayment program as "designed to assist J.D. graduates who choose
careers in the public service or other low-paying fields of law. '92
Harvard Law School's program applies to graduates who pursue
public interest, public sector, or low paying private sector work.93
88. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND
FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE, THE
FINAL REPORT (2003) [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND
FORGIVENESS] (describing public interest loan repayment programs at fifty-six law schools, as
well as related federal and state programs), available at http://www.abanet.orgflegalservices/
ownloadsflrap/lrapfinalreport.pdf.
89. University of Virginia School of Law, Virginia Loan Forgiveness Program, available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/publicserv/loanforgive.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2005).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. New York University School of Law, Melvyn and Barbara Weiss Loan Repayment
Assistance Program, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/depts/financialaid/lrap/index.html (last
visited Jan. 5, 2005).
93. Harvard Law School, Financial Aid: Low Income Protection Plan, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/finaid/lipp/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
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Academic accounts similarly link public interest law practice to
the amount of compensation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her analysis
of the attraction to cause lawyering, describes her interest in "seeking
to understand what motivates a lawyer to undertake work that is less
well compensated than traditional private legal work and that may
involve some personal, physical, economic, and social status risks."94
To see the legal profession's habit of equating public interest
with financial sacrifice, one need only look at the profession's use of
the phrase "for the public good" (pro bono publico). When did lawyers
come to equate "for thr public good" with lawyering for no fee?95
According to Judith Maute, who has examined the history of pro bono
legal representation, until the 1950s the phrase "pro bono publico"
was used in the general sense to refer to "the broad concept of what
was within the public interest" rather than to uncompensated legal
representation. 96 The phrase, according to Maute, was first used to
refer to uncompensated public interest legal representation in 1944. A
dissenting Third Circuit judge wrote that the attorneys in the patent
94. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 37; see also John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause
Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 181, 182 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998) (adopting, for his study of cause lawyers in private practice in Pittsburgh,
a definition that incorporates "Menkel-Meadow's notion that by engaging in this kind of work,
the cause lawyer incurs personal, physical, economic, or social status risks."). Menkel-Meadow
notes that there are exceptions: "Not all cause lawyers are self-sacrificing. The literature almost
always assumes income and prestige deprivation, but often cause lawyers may make more
money in some forms of organized cause lawyering (class actions, plaintiffs' personal injury
work) and many gain fame and prestige by what they do." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 40, at 59
n.57.
95. To be more precise, the profession's modern usage of the phrase "pro bono publico"
includes representation without fee as well as some instances of representation for a
substantially reduced fee. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1(b)(2) (2004)
(including, as a secondary means of compliance with the ethical obligation of pro bono publico
service, "delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means").
96. Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono Responsibilities: From
Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 113 (2002). Maute refers to a
number of early cases that use the phrase in its general sense. Id. at 113-114, 113 n.123. Two of
the cases Maute cites, in turn, refer to Lord Coke's 1584 decision in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a,
7b (1584), in which Coke laid out four considerations for construing a statute, one of which is
"to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,
and to suppress the subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief,
and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."
Lord Coke's use of the term thus relates to construing a statute in light of the statute's purpose
for the good of the public. Other early cases similarly used the term in its straightforward
meaning. In the 1828 case of Brandon v. Planters' & Merchants'Bank of Huntsville, for example,
the court noted the requirement that treasure trove must be shared with the king for the public
good: "'Treasure trove in England is a part of the king's prerogative, or at least of his revenue.
The finder was required to divide with the king pro bono publico." Maute, supra, at 113-14
(quoting Brandon v. Planters' & Merchs.' Bank of Huntsville, 1 Stew. 320, 331 (Ala. 1828)).
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case at issue should not have been awarded fees because their service
was voluntary and they were "to be thought of as having primarily
acted pro bono publico of their own volition. ' 97 She notes, however,
that the term "pro bono" was used by the ABA Legal Ethics
Committee in the 1930s to refer to representation of low-income
persons for free or for reduced rates. 98
The Oxford English Dictionary ("OED") defines the phrase in
its simple translation: "pro bono publico, for the public good. Now
freq. used as a signature to an open letter (as to a newspaper)." 99 The
OED offers several examples of the term's use, including this one from
James Joyce's Ulysses: "Someone ... ought to write a letter pro bono
publico to the papers about the muzzling order for a dog the like of
that."100  None of the references suggest uncompensated legal
representation. 101
Suffice it to say that in most of its use until recent decades, the
phrase "pro bono publico" simply meant "for the public good." It did
not, for the most part, refer to legal work for no fee. Modern usage of
the term in the legal profession, however, refers to legal work in the
public interest-particularly representation of poor or otherwise
underserved client bases-for little or no fee. 0 2
97. Maute, supra note 96, at 114 (quoting Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 147
F.2d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 1944) (Jones, J., dissenting)).
98. Id. at 115, 115 n.134 (citing, inter alia, ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics & Grievances,
Formal Op. 148 (1935)).
99. 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 529 (2d ed. 1989).
100. Id. (quoting JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 306 (1922)).
101. Id. Interestingly, one of the OED's references for "pro bono publico" does foreshadow
the term's use to describe uncompensated legal representation, although one cannot glean this
meaning from the dictionary's entry itself. The earliest use of the term offered by the OED is an
eighteenth century English case reporter, with the following entry in the dictionary: "1726
GILBERT Cases in Law & Equity (1760) 113 It is pro bono publico, in which they are included."
Id. The entry appears to use the phrase pro bono publico simply as a general term referring to
the public good, but examination of the source reveals a foreshadowing of the meaning the
phrase would later develop. The particular case report to which this entry refers is Regina v.
Cobbold (K.B. 1713), in GILBERT, CASES IN LAW & EQUITY 111 (2d ed. 1792). Cobbold involved
the issue of whether an informer may also be a witness or whether a conflict of interest exists
because an informer has an interest in obtaining a portion of the forfeiture. It was objected that
such a prohibition would discourage prosecutions "for a Man will not be at the Trouble to cause
an Information to be made, unless he may have Part of the Penalty." Id. The answer to that
objection, according to the report in Gilbert's volume, was that people will serve as informers for
the public good, regardless of whether they receive part of the penalty: "Answer, Men are
presumed to love the Laws of their Country, and the Execution of them, it is pro bono publico, in
which they are included." Id. at 113. Thus, although the OED's reference to Gilbert appears only
to offer the phrase in its denotation of "for the public good," the report of the Cobbold case in fact
uses the phrase to describe conduct undertaken for the public good without personal
compensation.
102. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (7th ed. 1999); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1
(2004).
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The legal profession's current use of the terms "public interest"
and "pro bono publico" reveals that the prevailing conception of public
interest work is based on an implicit determination of market
undervaluation. In other words, legal work is considered public
interest work if the market level of compensation does not adequately
reflect the perceived social good that the work produces. Market-
undervaluation suggests the need for subsidies. In law practice, such
subsidies take various forms. Student loan repayments, summer
fellowships, and job grants provide monetary subsidies. The ethical
obligation to do pro bono work provides a subsidy in the form of
uncompensated lawyer time and resources. There also are intangible
subsidies. To the extent certain legal work commands respect and
admiration because of its status as public interest work, the lawyer
receives what might be called an "honor subsidy." And an intangible
subsidy can be seen also, in the personal satisfaction that many
lawyers experience from working in the public interest.103 These
tangible and intangible subsidies increase the appeal for lawyers to
undertake legal work that serves the public good but otherwise would
fail to attract sufficient lawyers because the market compensation is
lower than the work's social value.
For purposes of allocating subsidies, market-undervaluation
serves as a suitable definition. Obviously, public interest loan
repayment and grant programs should be designed to provide funds
for students who pursue relatively low-paying jobs. 104 The entire point
of such programs is to counteract income imbalances to permit
students a wider range of choices that serve the public good. High-
paying law practice jobs do not need the financial assistance of law
schools to attract well-qualified applicants. It makes eminent sense to
reserve such funds for socially useful jobs whose low pay renders the
jobs infeasible as a practical matter for students who graduate law
school with heavy debt loads.
103. Some critics advance a more cynical view of the motivations of public interest lawyers,
as well as a more skeptical view of the possibility of achieving social change through litigation.
Public interest lawyers, on this view, are attracted to litigation as a reform mechanism based
largely on their personal aspirations. "[M]ovement lawyers are said to be motivated by glory,
status, and prestige to expand their reputations by engaging in legal duels from which they
might emerge victorious." Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's
'Allurements": A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 262-63 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (describing, but not entirely adopting, the views of these
critics).
104. See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION REPORT ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, supra note
88 (discussing rising law student debt and the growing disparity between private sector and
public service compensation and the resulting need for loan repayment assistance programs to
enable students to pursue careers devoted to public service).
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Similarly, the ethical obligation to engage in pro bono work 10 5
makes sense as a subsidy of lawyer time to serve otherwise
underrepresented client bases.'0 6 Part of the allure of pro bono work
is the satisfaction lawyers get from providing legal services to those
who otherwise would be unable to afford them. The intangible
rewards of pro bono practice-what I described above as the personal
satisfaction and honor subsidies' 07-are nicely captured by one large
firm partner who describes the choice he made at age fifty-five to give
up some of his compensation and to devote 40 percent of his billable
hours to pro bono work: "Do I really need all the money I'd be making
if I continued to work full time, or can I give that up for the intangible
rewards of working in the public interest?"108
The prevailing conception of public interest lawyering, linked
to low compensation or market-undervaluation, works well for
determining subsidies, but it may be too narrow a definition for other
purposes. In particular, it may be too narrow a conception for
purposes of understanding a more general duty to serve the public
good, a responsibility that is frequently urged as a central component
of lawyer professionalism.
B. Lawyer Professionalism
Roscoe Pound famously defined a profession as a group
"pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public
service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood." 109 For present purposes, there are two things
worth noting in Pound's definition. First, it links professionalism with
serving the public interest. The professional lawyer, by this
definition, is a public interest lawyer. "It is of the essence of a
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 ("Every lawyer has a professional
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render
at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.").
106. The Model Rule and its comment emphasize that pro bono work, for the most part,
should serve those who otherwise would be unable to afford representation. Id. ("In fulfilling
this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal
services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2) charitable,
religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are
designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means."); id. cmt. 2 ("Paragraphs
(a)(1) and (a)(2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited
means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the
disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee.").
107. See supra text accompanying note 103.
108. Alicia Upano, Creating Second Acts in Legal Careers, N.J. L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at 22
(quoting Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom partner Douglas Robinson).
109. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
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profession," Pound wrote, "that it is practiced in a spirit of public
service." 110  Second, the definition relegates money-making to
secondary status. The professional lawyer, according to Pound, is not
one who pursues wealth as a primary objective. Lest there be any
doubt, he added that "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a
public service is the primary purpose. Gaining a livelihood is
incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the entire purpose.""11
Thus, according to Pound, the true professional often renders services
without compensation, "and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward."1 12
Descriptions of lawyer's professional duties dating back to a
century before Pound likewise centered on public-spiritedness, and
similar ideas dominate more recent discussions of professionalism.
The two most influential statements of nineteenth century American
legal ethics-David Hoffman's Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment and George Sharswood's Essay on American Ethics-both
included strong notions of professional obligation to the public good .13
More recently, the American Bar Association's Commission on
Professionalism, in addition to adopting Pound's definition, offered an
additional definition by sociologist Eliot Freidson that included the
idea that "the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's self-
interest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's
interest and the public good."' 14 The Commission urged lawyers to
remain focused on public service and not to be distracted by the
pursuit of wealth: "All segments of the Bar should ... [r]esist the
temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a principal goal of law
practice."l1 5
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Pearce, America's Governing Class, supra note 20, at 388-91. Pearce links early notions
of lawyer professionalism to Federalist No. 35's description of the learned professions as
comprised of virtuous and independent members of a governing class. Id. at 386-88, 390.
114. ABA Comm. on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, Informal Op. 10 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 261
(1987) [hereinafter ABA Comm. on Professionalism] (quoting New York University sociologist
and ABA Commission member, Eliot Freidson). A decade later, the ABA released a report on
legal education and lawyer professionalism, which adopted the following expanded version of the
Pound definition: "A professional lawyer is an expert in law pursuing a learned art in service to
clients and in the spirit of public service: and engaging in these pursuits as part of a common
calling to promote justice and public good." Teaching and Learning Professionalism, 1996 ABA.
SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, PROFESSIONALISM COMM. 6.
115. ABA Comm. on Professionalism, supra note 114, at 265. Similarly, Judge Harry
Edwards has emphasized "public spiritedness" as one of the highest ideals of the legal profession.
"[A]s a part of their professional role," Judge Edwards wrote, 'lawyers have a positive duty to
[Vol. 57:6:20872112
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The tension between the pursuit of wealth and professional
obligations emerges often in debates over lawyer advertising. As
Justice Blackmun wrote in 1977 while striking down a ban on lawyer
advertising, "At its core, the argument [that advertising erodes
professionalism] presumes that attorneys must conceal from
themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn
their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in
such self-deception."' 16  By contrast, Justice O'Connor, who has
supported relatively broad restrictions on lawyer advertising, has
justified her position by invoking the professional ideal that lawyers'
primary goal should be public service rather than the pursuit of
wealth:
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other occupations that may be
equally respectable, is that membership entails an ethical obligation to temper one's
selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be
enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the market. There are sound
reasons to continue pursuing the goal that is implicit in the traditional view of
professional life. Both the special privileges incident to membership in the profession
and the advantages those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a living are
means to a goal that transcends the accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service,
which in the legal profession can take a variety of familiar forms.
1 1 7
Thus, to Justice O'Connor, the professional goal of public service is
linked to the "ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of
economic success."
In an earlier pair of advertising cases, the Supreme Court
emphasized the distinction between fee-driven work and public
interest work. The same day that the Court decided Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association, which upheld a categorical ban on certain types
serve the public good." Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1148, 1150 (1990).
United States lawyers are not alone in worrying about the tension between money-making
and devotion to the public good; similar concerns resonate across different legal cultures. See,
e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for
Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 639 (2000) ("The Nigerian legal profession is
at a mortal risk of irrelevance chiefly because of its obsession with materialism. Materialism has
eclipsed the obligation to public good, widely celebrated as one of the distinguishing features of
the legal profession. Commitment to the public good has disappeared from the moral horizon of
the legal profession. Lawyers are far less concerned with promoting the public good than with
enriching themselves."); see also Neta Ziv, Combining Professionalism, Nation Building and
Public Service: The Professional Project of the Israeli Bar 1928-2002, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621,
1643 (2003) (noting that Israeli legal ethics rules "are generally silent about lawyers' substantive
ethical obligations to the public good, including third parties and society at large," but recent
developments have given greater emphasis to public interest lawyering in Israel).
116. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). Justice Blackmun concluded,
"Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism, the
historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled." Id. at 371-72.
117. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of client solicitation, 118 the Court also decided In re Primus,119 which
permitted solicitation of clients by lawyers "seeking to further political
and ideological goals through associational activity, including
litigation." 120 The Court saw a clear distinction between legal work for
ideological goals and legal work for pecuniary gain. The Court found
"no basis for equating the work of lawyers associated with the ACLU
or the NAACP with that of a group that exists for the primary purpose
of financial gain through the recovery of counsel fees. ' 121 In drawing a
line between Ohralik, a personal injury case, and Primus, a civil
rights case, the Court reinforced the perception that public interest
work is something apart from most law practice. The Rules of
Professional Conduct have incorporated this distinction, prohibiting
solicitation "when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain."122 The ABA comment to the rule explains
that the prohibition is not justified "in situations in which the lawyer
is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary
gain."1 23  Taken together, the Rule and Comment appear to treat
motivations as an either/or matter: either the lawyer is motivated by
pecuniary gain, or the lawyer is motivated by other considerations.
Such a binary view of lawyer motives is problematic not only because
it oversimplifies human motivations 124 but also because it unwittingly
undermines a central theme of professionalism-that even in their
standard fee-generating work, lawyers should be driven in part by
commitment to the public good. 125
C. Redefining Public Interest Lawyering
While acknowledging that views on lawyer professionalism are
far from uniform-there are fundamental disagreements concerning
the proper balance between zealous client representation and
118. 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
119. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
120. Id. at 414.
121. Id. at 431. But see id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the neat
distinction between politically expressive litigation and other litigation is untenable).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2004).
123. Id. R. 7.3 cmt. 4.
124. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
125. While the theme of commitment to the public good pervades discussions of lawyer
professionalism, see supra text accompanying notes 109-115, views differ substantially on the
extent to which lawyers should focus on the public good as compared to loyal and zealous
representation of their clients, see infra note 126.
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attentiveness to the public good 12 6--this Article proceeds on the basis
of the widely accepted views that public-spiritedness is, on the whole,
a virtue for lawyers, and that increasing lawyers' commitment to the
public interest would do more good than harm. With that objective in
mind, it may be useful to rethink the prevailing conception of public
interest lawyering for purposes other than subsidies. If lawyers are to
become more comfortable with the notion that commitment to the
public good should pervade their work, then perhaps "public interest"
should not be used to refer only to a relatively small segment of
practice. And if such a rethinking is in order, then perhaps mass tort
lawyers, as stark examples of lawyers who pursue fees while speaking
the rhetoric of social change, offer a juxtaposition that can facilitate
reconsideration of the prevailing conception.
1. Reconciling Public Interest with the Business of Practicing Law
Defining public interest work in terms of lack of compensation
may have an unintended consequence in its effect on the attitudes of
lawyers whose work does not fall within the narrow definition.
Therefore, a departure from a one-size-fits-all definition may be in
order. For purposes of determining subsidies for legal work
representing underrepresented client bases, the prevailing conception
of public interest practice as market-undervalued legal work functions
well. But for purposes of professional identity, a broader conception of
public interest work that does not depend upon undercompensation
may be preferable.
Russell Pearce has advanced the important and
counterintuitive argument that the growth of the public interest bar
in the 1960s and the rise of the pro bono duty in the 1970s encouraged
elite business lawyers to abandon an earlier sense of obligation to the
public good. 127 On the growth of the public interest bar, Pearce
126. Compare, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS (3d ed. 2004) (advancing an advocacy perspective); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (same) with
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (advancing a moral activist
perspective); WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS (1998)
(advancing a competing vision, focused on legal merit and justice rather than on subjective
morality). See generally Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqug, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127, 136-
47 (2002) (discussing the intellectual history of the "moral activism project").
127. See Pearce, America's Governing Class, supra note 20, at 417-19 (discussing the impact
of the development of the public interest bar); id. at 419-20 (discussing the impact of the rise of
the pro bono duty); see also Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social
Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 201, 202-03 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998)
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describes the 1960s rise of "a new segment of the bar"125 whose
members "followed the model of the NAACP's Charles Hamilton
Houston and Thurgood Marshall in identifying themselves as
advocates promoting particular visions of social justice."'129 The effect
of the development of the public interest bar on the professional self-
identity of other lawyers, as Pearce describes it, is indirect but
nonetheless significant:
The creation of the public interest bar undermined the governing class perspective in
two significant ways. First, the use of the term "public interest" to describe the work of
public interest lawyers indicated that these lawyers, and not big business lawyers, were
responsible for the public good. This view became dominant in the legal community.
1 3 0
It is reasonable to extend Pearce's insight beyond the elite
business bar. To the extent that lawyers and law students internalize
a conception of public interest as a bounded area of practice, as the
exception rather than the norm, that understanding may diminish
their sense of personal responsibility to advance the public good in the
ends and means of their law practice.
With regard to the pro bono duty, Pearce argues that in the
1970s, the rise of pro bono as a distinct ethical obligation' 3' led to an
abandonment of a broader sense of duty to the public good:
The pro bono duty thus provided elite lawyers with an opportunity to consider
themselves in compliance with their public obligations while at the same time
abandoning the governing class role. By defining a narrow sphere of public interest
practice separate from the lawyer's remunerative representation of big business, pro
bono permitted lawyers to compartmentalize their public service obligations and avoid
the governing class tension of mediating between client interests and the public good.
(describing the effort to obtain support for public interest nonprofit organizations and the
concomitant devaluation of private practitioners' potential contribution to cause lawyering).
128. Pearce, America's Governing Class, supra note 20, at 417.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 418; see also Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, supra note 20 ("The very term 'public
interest law' suggested that these lawyers, and not big.business lawyers, were the guardians of
the public interest."). Pearce mentions several ways in which this attitudinal shift manifested
itself.
For example, when commentators described the public interest work of big firms, they
only mentioned the pro bono work that was either in direct support of public interest
lawyers or the same kind of work as that done by public interest lawyers, not
representation of business clients. Similarly, when commentators gauged entering
law students' commitment to the public good, they referred to the number of students
who planned to pursue careers in public interest law. When many students instead
chose big firm practice, commentators described this as a failure of commitment to the
public good.
Pearce, America's Governing Class, supra note 20, at 418 (footnotes omitted).
131. "The governing class ideal had long included the belief that providing free legal services
to those who could not afford them was one component of the lawyer's duty to promote the public
good. During the 1970s, lawyers began to focus on supplying free legal services as a separate
ethical duty and to refer to this obligation as the lawyer's pro bono duty." Id. at 419 (footnotes
omitted).
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While representing paying clients, elite lawyers could be "hired guns." They would
fulfill their public interest obligation through pro bono work, often involving assistance
to full-time public interest lawyers.
13 2
Just as the presence of a distinct public interest bar permits
lawyers to regard the public good as something only a small portion of
lawyers advance, the presence of a distinct pro bono obligation permits
lawyers to regard the public good as something most lawyers advance
in only a small portion of their practice.
Thus, while others contend that rising commercialism in law
practice has brought a decline in professional commitment to the
public good, Pearce urges a different understanding of the relationship
between professionalism and the business of practicing law. In his
view, efforts to reinvigorate lawyers' commitment to the public good
have failed because they have tried to detach professionalism from
business. For such efforts to succeed, he suggests, "commitment to the
public good must be reconciled with the acknowledgement that law is
a business.' 1 33
To pick up on Pearce's suggestion, if commitment to the public
good is to be reconciled with the business of practicing law, then the
notion of public interest lawyering must not be unduly confined to
particular practice areas or narrowly drawn policy goals. Policy
objectives may play more or less central roles depending on the nature
of the representation, but whether lawyers handle school
desegregation cases, mass torts, or other matters, and whether they
represent plaintiffs or defendants, do transactional work, or work in-
house, the practice of law includes opportunities to serve the public
good.
A broader conception can encompass every area of practice as a
plausible realm of public interest lawyering. A line from a well-known
retaliatory discharge case helps drive this point home. In a case
brought by a former in-house attorney at General Dynamics
Corporation, the Supreme Court of California described the important
work done by in-house corporate lawyers. The court described in-
house attorneys' "advisory and compliance role, anticipating potential
legal problems, advising on possible solutions, and generally assisting
the corporation in achieving its business aims while minimizing
entanglement in the increasingly complex legal web that regulates
132. Id. at 420.
133. Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, supra note 20, at 65; see also Russell G. Pearce, The
Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct
and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995) [hereinafter The Professional
Paradigm Shift].
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organizational conduct in our society." 134 In deciding to allow in-house
attorneys to pursue claims for retaliatory discharge, the court noted
that "their professional work is by definition affected with a public
interest."135  The line is a powerful reminder that all lawyering
potentially concerns the public good. If working in the legal
department of a Fortune 500 company is "public interest" work, then
so is virtually every other job in the legal profession. Some lawyering
is addressed more explicitly to the public interest, but the practice of
law "is by definition affected with a public interest." With respect to
this view, whether the lawyer's primary motive is money or a social
cause, it is appropriate for the lawyer to feel a responsibility to the
public good even in fee-based private practice work.
This professional norm, stated most broadly, suggests that
lawyers should share a commitment to the public good in their legal
work, including substantial fee-generating work. This broad norm,
however, may describe two quite different commitments, focusing
either on ends or on means. The first is a commitment to the public
good in the lawyer's selection of work. In the clients and causes a
lawyer chooses to represent, a lawyer shows a commitment to serving
the public interest through legal representation. The second is a
commitment to the public good in the way the lawyer goes about her
work. By taking seriously professional duties that serve the public
interest but conflict with the lawyer's narrow self-interest, a lawyer
demonstrates a professional concern for the public good.
The rules governing lawyer conduct embrace the second
version, at least in part, but eschew the first. Duty to the public good
in the means by which lawyers pursue their work-that is, the duty in
certain circumstances to place the public interest ahead of both the
lawyer's and client's personal interests--characterizes many of the
specific obligations embodied in rules governing lawyer conduct.
These duties include the duty of candor to the tribunal, 136 the duty not
to destroy or conceal evidence, 137 the duty of honesty in dealing with
third parties, 138 and the duty to refrain from asserting nonmeritorious
claims or defenses. 139 But the dominant strain of modern legal ethics
doctrine is more hostile to the idea that lawyers' duty to serve the
public interest extends to the choice of which client objectives should
134. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court., 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994).
135. Id. at 498.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004).
137. Id. R. 3.4; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), 37.
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2004).
139. Id. R. 3.1; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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be served. The principle of "moral nonaccountability 140 is embodied
in the rule that a lawyer's representation of a client "does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities."14 1  While a number of scholars have
advanced powerful arguments against the principle of moral
nonaccountability, 142 for the most part the profession has resisted
embracing a general duty to the public interest in the causes and
clients that lawyers choose to represent.
Mass tort lawyers, with their headline-generating fees and
their public interest rhetoric, implicitly challenge two tenets. First, by
their expressions in word and deed of commitment to public interest
policy objectives, 143 they implicitly challenge the notion that public
interest lawyering is restricted to undercompensated work. Second, as
private practitioners who proclaim commitment to the broader causes
of the clients they represent and express aversion to representing the
other side, 144 they implicitly challenge the principle of moral
nonaccountability.
Thus, if one wishes to rethink accepted notions of public
interest lawyering, mass tort lawyers provide a useful focal point, in
part because mass tort fees have gained such notoriety in the most
widely publicized cases. Mass tort practice can serve the public
interest by accomplishing worthwhile policy objectives, but it is not, to
say the least, generally perceived as undervalued in terms of market
compensation. A definition of public interest lawyering that includes
mass tort plaintiffs' practice thus cannot focus on undercompensation.
Mass tort lawyers earn substantial fees while describing themselves
as serving the public interest through social change advocacy. In this
regard, mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers display an odd resemblance to the
elite business lawyers of an earlier era, whom Pearce describes as
140. See LUBAN, supra note 126, at xix-xx, 7 (describing the "standard conception of the
lawyer's role" in terms of (1) partisan zeal for the client's interests and (2) moral
nonaccountability). Luban refers to Murray Schwartz, who used the term "principle of
nonaccountablity," and Luban renames Schwartz's "principle of professionalism" to refer to
"partisanship." Id. at 7 (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978)).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2004).
142. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2000); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002).
143. See supra Part II.
144. See supra note 47.
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lawyers that "made a lot of money and considered themselves servants
of the public good." 145
A clearer understanding of the difference between defining
public interest lawyering for purposes of subsidies and defining it for
purposes of the professional duty to the public good may assist in
overcoming the obstacle that Pearce identifies-the need to reconcile
the professional ideal of commitment to the public good with the
professional reality of law as a business. 146
2. Public Interest Lawyering and Self-Serving Bias
A more inclusive conception of public interest lawyering,
however, with little else to confine its definition, collides with the
human tendency to convince oneself of the truth of what serves one's
self-interest. Lawyers may believe their work serves the public good
because it serves themselves. Thus, redefining public interest practice
to encompass highly compensated, multiple-motive work may
accomplish little. Rather, it may simply indulge lawyers' tendencies to
convince themselves of the moral goodness of their most lucrative fee-
generating work. There is reason, at least, to be skeptical that
reconceptualizing public interest work would have any appreciable
impact on lawyer conduct. At worst, such a redefinition could relieve
some lawyers of their sense of commitment to market-undervalued
public interest work through pro bono work or career choices.
"Self-serving bias," as used in social psychology and behavioral
economics, describes a bundle of human tendencies to perceive reality
in one's own favor. 147 In the context of litigation, Linda Babcock and
George Loewenstein have demonstrated that people have a tendency
"to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself."148  They
conducted experimental research using the context of a personal
injury tort case and found that when subjects were positioned with
145. Pearce, America's Governing Class, supra note 20, at 413. Pearce adds that the elite
lawyers did not apologize for their incomes: "They explained their large profits not Pq the
rewards of business conduct but as 'incidental' to their professionalism and the deserved reward
of the invisible hand of reputation." Id; see also Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift, supra
note 133, at 1245 (explaining how the "Professionalism Paradigm" legitimized great financial
success for lawyers).
146. Pearce, Retreat of the Elite, supra note 20.
147. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110-111 (1997). The self-serving bias includes the
tendency of most people to rate themselves above average in a variety of desirable skills or
attributes, as well as the tendency to attribute one's successes to ability but one's failures to bad
luck. Id.
148. Id. at 110.
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differing interests, the subjects arrived at significantly different
perceptions of fairness for the outcome of the case.149
In light of Babcock and Loewenstein's findings, legal ethicist
Paul Tremblay has discussed the problem that self-serving bias poses
for the moral activism project that various scholars have sought to
advance. 150 Given "how deeply the self-serving bias affects one's view
of a contested litigation matter,"'151 Tremblay analyzes the effect such
bias has on lawyers' interactions with their own clients. He suggests
that it predisposes lawyers to accept their clients' explanations and
thus renders most lawyers disinclined to challenge the morality of
their clients' conduct. 152 The lawyer, on this theory, "assesses any
moral questions that might arise through an '[e]gocentric
interpretation[] of fairness.' "153 Tremblay describes the effect of self-
serving bias on practicing lawyers:
You find yourself representing the good guys more often than you expected before you
joined that firm, and more often than the critics seem to think. If only they knew the
full story. If your clients are not unambiguously right, there are enough arguments and
unresolved fact disputes that prevent you from concluding that your client is the ogre
that he might appear to be from a distance. When the stakes are high, one may seem to
need fewer of those ambiguities and less strenuous arguments to persuade one that he
is in a gray area. In gray areas, who is to say which version is truly right?
15 4
Given the likelihood of self-serving bias in lawyers' perceptions
of their own work, a revised conception of public interest lawyering
presents three concerns. First, as mentioned above, a more inclusive
definition for nonsubsidy purposes may fail to accomplish anything
worthwhile in terms of actual commitment to the public good, because
lawyers will tend to view their own work as socially useful, rather
than shift their efforts to more socially beneficial work. Psychological
research asserts that "[w]henever individuals face tradeoffs between
what is best for themselves and what is morally correct, their
149. Id. at 111-14. It is worth noting that Babcock and Loewenstein's research findings
strongly suggest that the subjects disagreed in their sincerely held beliefs, not merely in their
instrumental use of fairness as an argument. When instructed to guess how much money a
judge awarded in the case and informed that they would be paid a premium for guessing
accurately within a range, the subjects nonetheless reached significantly different predictions
that correlated with their assigned self-interest in the experiment. Id. at 112-13. As Tremblay
notes, the research "demonstrates not posturing by the respective sides about how best to
package a case, but instead honest, sincere beliefs about a predictive, factual judgment."
Tremblay, supra note 126, at 171.
150. Tremblay, supra note 126, at 170-75.
151. Id. at 171 (citing Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 147, at 110-111).
152. Id. at 171-72.
153. Id. at 172 (quoting Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations
of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 178
(1992)).
154. Id. at 178.
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perceptions of moral correctness are likely to be biased in the direction
of what is best for themselves."'155 To the extent this is true, then it is
questionable whether most lawyers will seriously rethink the extent to
which their fee-generating work serves the public good. 156
Second, if lawyers are encouraged to view their fee-generating
work as public interest work as long as it pursues socially constructive
objectives, they may be more inclined to take ethically questionable
steps, on the idea that in pursuit of public good, the ends justify the
means. As Tremblay notes, "[S]ometimes you need to be aggressive
when justice is on your side. Indeed, the moral activists say exactly
that. Once aggressive, technicality-exploiting practices are justified
for the good guys, the important question then becomes identifying the
good guys."'157
Third, encouraging lawyers to think broadly about their
practice as public interest work may have the effect of discouraging
commitment to the market-undervalued work that is in greatest need
of subsidies. Why should a public-minded lawyer do public interest
work for a pittance, if instead the lawyer can do public interest work
for a fortune? Put differently, in the context of highly compensated
work that may or may not serve the public good, self-serving bias
redirects intangible subsidies that should be earmarked for market-
undervalued legal work. To the extent lawyers can persuade
themselves and others that their work serves the public good, they
benefit to some extent from the intangible subsidies of honor and
personal satisfaction that ordinarily accompany public interest
work. 158 These intangible subsidies are not finite goods, but even so,
there is a risk that if lawyers can get the intangible benefits of public
interest work while getting the very tangible fees of private practice,
they may be less inclined to devote their work in whole or in part to
the market-undervalued public interest work that has a better claim
on subsidies.
155. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 147, at 120.
156. Tremblay makes a similar point with regard to lawyers' unwillingness to engage clients
in discussion of the morality of their conduct:
[T]he moral activism project, despite its brilliance, seems to have had very little
influence on the lives of practicing lawyers. I suggest here that the failure of moral
activism is not the fault of the project's sensibility, but instead follows from the way
that busy lawyers working in complicated settings understand and come to believe
facts about the world.
Tremblay, supra note 126, at 182-83.
157. Id. at 178 (footnote omitted).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 104-108 (discussing tangible and intangible
subsidies for public interest law practice).
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Ultimately, whether a redefinition of public interest lawyering
would do more good or harm depends largely on two variables. First,
it depends on the extent to which such a redefinition helps lawyers
reconcile money-making with their professional duty to the public
good. If lawyers conceive of public interest as an aspect of every law
practice, rather than as a distinct area of practice for a small band of
the exceptionally virtuous, then they increasingly may keep the public
good in mind in both the ends and means of their everyday work.
Second, it depends on the extent to which such a redefinition helps
lawyers persuade themselves that their self-interested conduct serves
the public good. If lawyers tend to view both the ends and means of
their fee-generating work as serving the public interest, then market-
undervalued public interest work may lose some part of its appeal to
broad segments of the bar.
V. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the semester, I hand out index cards and
ask my law students why they came to law school and what career
plans they may have. A fairly common response is reflected in an
index card I received this year:
I came to law school to learn how to help other people. I want to help people with
problems they cannot solve on their own. Right now I want to get a big firm job, but
after I take their money and clerk, I want to work in public interest.
15 9
The desire to "take their money" in a big firm job before moving
on to work in "public interest," as announced by this student, differs
from others more in its candor than in its underlying sentiment.160 I
suppose one could find it heartening that the student wishes to do
public interest work. Despite the laudable long-term plan, however, I
cannot help being disheartened as I read the student's unstated
assumption that the ordinary private practice of law is all about
accumulating wealth rather than about helping people or serving the
public good. I worry that too many practicing attorneys share this
sense that law practice is merely a livelihood while public interest
work is something that others do. 161
When law students, lawyers, and others speak of public
interest work as something apart from ordinary law practice, they
159. Student index card, Professional Responsibility, Fall 2003 (on file with author).
160. An equally candid but ultimately less public-minded response was offered by a student
who had left a career in public service to become a lawyer: "I've already helped people, now it's
time to make $." Student index card, Civil Procedure, Fall 2003 (on file with author).
161. Deborah Rhode cites a study that found that only 20 percent of lawyers believe that
their work contributes to the social good. RHODE, supra note 142, at 8.
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mean it in the most positive sense. It is an expression of appreciation
for the contributions and sacrifices of those lawyers who seek to
advance the public interest as their primary objective, despite
personal cost. From this perspective, Thurgood Marshall is not only
an individual lawyer-hero, 162 but he also is emblematic of a class of
lawyers who devote their practice to the public good and who are
perceived by many lawyers as a breed apart. 163 A lawyer may look at
the public interest bar with the distant appreciation that comes from
knowing he has no intention of following in those footsteps. It is
fitting humility, perhaps, that most lawyers do not see themselves as
Thurgood Marshalls. But one wonders if the profession might be
better off, and the public better served, if more lawyers tried to see
themselves as following in Marshall's footsteps, in the sense of sharing
commitment to the public interest through the practice of law.
While other lawyers humbly excuse themselves from public
interest practice, mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers-not a group
particularly known for humility-proclaim their commitment to such
goals as consumer protection, product safety, and corporate
responsibility, and declare that they are turning to the courts just as
Marshall did in Brown. In so doing, they call attention to the
possibility that lawyers can pursue social change objectives while
earning substantial fees. They also illustrate the broader point that
outside of traditional realms of public interest practice, commitment to
the public good can be part of the multiple motivations that drive
lawyers. It is misleading to divide lawyers into those who pursue good
and those who pursue wealth. In reality, the line is not so neat, and if
the professional norm of public service is to be reconciled with the
professional reality of law as a business, it is important not to
oversimplify the motivations of lawyers who seek simultaneously to
make money and to accomplish socially useful objectives.
The prevailing conception of public interest law practice, like
the modern usage of the phrase "pro bono publico," reinforces the
distinction between lawyering for a livelihood and lawyering for the
public good. Public interest lawyering need not be defined the same
way for all purposes. Defining public interest lawyering as work that
162. See supra text accompanying note 3. For a nicely balanced introduction to lawyer-hero
stories, acknowledging both the usefulness of hero exaltation and the danger of succumbing to
nostalgia, see W. Bradley Wendel, Symposium Introduction: Our Love-Hate Relationship with
Heroic Lawyers, 13 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003).
163. One poverty lawyer in Pittsburgh describes the perception of cause lawyers in the
general legal community as one of vaguely affectionate bemusement: 'We've been around so long
that the bar is starting to get used to us. They probably just think we're a bit strange to give up
money to take these cases. But generally we're not disliked or viewed as a threat." Kilwein,
supra note 94, at 197.
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serves the public good to a greater extent than recognized by market
levels of compensation-that is, as market-undervalued legal
work-makes sense for purposes of determining subsidies such as loan
repayment assistance and the ethical duty to engage in pro bono work.
Market-undervaluation works less well, however, as a definition of
public interest lawyering for purposes of professional self-perception.
Indeed, the prevailing conception of public interest practice may have
the paradoxical effect of diminishing the profession's overall level of
commitment to the public good.
On the other hand, lawyers are likely subject to the human
tendency to perceive fairness in accord with self-interest. It is not
difficult for most lawyers to view their own practice as sufficiently
consonant with the public good so that a professional norm of public-
mindedness would not require them to modify their practice.
Therefore, even if one accepts that the prevailing conception of public
interest practice has the unintended consequence of leaving others
less committed to the public good, it remains questionable whether a
reconception of public interest practice would have any appreciable
effect on either the ends that lawyers choose to pursue or the means
by which they choose to pursue them.
20041 2125

